Ultimate privacy...Better than TOR

[jos]

<quote>The potential problem with Tor is that if an adversary gets enough nodes on the network, they can work together to track the progress of packets. They might not be able to tell exactly what is being sent, but they can put together a breadcrumb trail tying a user to traffic coming out of an exit node. A team of researchers led by MIT grad studentAlbert Kwon (with help from EPFL) aims to leapfrog Tor’s anonymizing technique with a brand new platform called Riffle. In addition to wrapping messages in multiple layers of encryption (the eponymous technique of Tor, “The Onion Router”), Riffle adds two extra measures meant to baffle would-be attackers.

First, servers switch up the order in which received messages are passed on to the next node, preventing anyone scrutinizing incoming and outgoing traffic from tracking packets using metadata.

Then comes a two-part measure to prevent a malicious server from simply replacing real messages with dummies and tracking a single target one. Messages are sent from the user to all servers, not just one — and outgoing messages must be signed with an independently verifiable mathematical proof that they are the ones the server received. This way, any server tampering with messages will be spotted at once. </quote>

 

 heart of the system is a series of servers called a mixnet. Each server permutes the order in which it receives messages before passing them on to the next. An adversary that had tracked the messages’ points of origin would have no idea which was which by the time they exited the last server.  With onion encryption, the sending computer wraps each message in several layers of encryption, using a public-key encryption system like those that safeguard most financial transactions online. Each server in the mixnet removes only one layer of encryption, so that only the last server knows a message’s ultimate destination.

To thwart message tampering, Riffle uses a technique called a verifiable shuffle. Because of the onion encryption, the messages that each server forwards look nothing like the ones it receives; it has peeled off a layer of encryption. But the encryption can be done in such a way that the server can generate a mathematical proof that the messages it sends are valid manipulations of the ones it receives.

Verifying the proof does require checking it against copies of the messages the server received. So with Riffle, users send their initial messages to not just the first server in the mixnet but all of them, simultaneously. Servers can then independently check for tampering. As long as one server in the mixnet remains uncompromised by an adversary, Riffle is cryptographically secure.

 

Source :Link

[NinjaJc01]

You forget TAILS, tor's operating system.

[NinjaJc01]

4 minutes ago, jos said:

<quote>The potential problem with Tor is that if an adversary gets enough nodes on the network, they can work together to track the progress of packets. They might not be able to tell exactly what is being sent, but they can put together a breadcrumb trail tying a user to traffic coming out of an exit node. A team of researchers led by MIT grad studentAlbert Kwon (with help from EPFL) aims to leapfrog Tor’s anonymizing technique with a brand new platform called Riffle. In addition to wrapping messages in multiple layers of encryption (the eponymous technique of Tor, “The Onion Router”), Riffle adds two extra measures meant to baffle would-be attackers.

First, servers switch up the order in which received messages are passed on to the next node, preventing anyone scrutinizing incoming and outgoing traffic from tracking packets using metadata.

Then comes a two-part measure to prevent a malicious server from simply replacing real messages with dummies and tracking a single target one. Messages are sent from the user to all servers, not just one — and outgoing messages must be signed with an independently verifiable mathematical proof that they are the ones the server received. This way, any server tampering with messages will be spotted at once. </quote>

 

 heart of the system is a series of servers called a mixnet. Each server permutes the order in which it receives messages before passing them on to the next. An adversary that had tracked the messages’ points of origin would have no idea which was which by the time they exited the last server.  With onion encryption, the sending computer wraps each message in several layers of encryption, using a public-key encryption system like those that safeguard most financial transactions online. Each server in the mixnet removes only one layer of encryption, so that only the last server knows a message’s ultimate destination.

To thwart message tampering, Riffle uses a technique called a verifiable shuffle. Because of the onion encryption, the messages that each server forwards look nothing like the ones it receives; it has peeled off a layer of encryption. But the encryption can be done in such a way that the server can generate a mathematical proof that the messages it sends are valid manipulations of the ones it receives.

Verifying the proof does require checking it against copies of the messages the server received. So with Riffle, users send their initial messages to not just the first server in the mixnet but all of them, simultaneously. Servers can then independently check for tampering. As long as one server in the mixnet remains uncompromised by an adversary, Riffle is cryptographically secure.

 

Source :Link

But surely if "But the encryption can be done in such a way that the server can generate a mathematical proof that the messages it sends are valid manipulations of the ones it receives." Then it can be hacked fairly easily.

[laminutederire]

11 minutes ago, NinjaJc01 said:

But surely if "But the encryption can be done in such a way that the server can generate a mathematical proof that the messages it sends are valid manipulations of the ones it receives." Then it can be hacked fairly easily.

And why would it be because of that? 

[NinjaJc01]

2 minutes ago, laminutederire said:

And why would it be because of that? 

If the servers can check, then surely reverse engineering would apply.

[laminutederire]

2 minutes ago, NinjaJc01 said:

If the servers can check, then surely reverse engineering would apply.

So? It's the whole point of RSA encryption for instance.  It works both ways, but mathematically the reverse operation is way harder if you don't know everything you should.

[FPSwithaWacomTablet]

So we have a next dead man... Riffle will not come to fruition, considering how the govt. does not like encryption and "going dark"