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What is going on and where is the settings to make it again.............. I used to have them in separate folders,like favorite,minimized etc

The verge reports that Google is shutting down the google maps editor because the peeing Android on an Apple debacle. Source: http://www.theverge.com/2015/5/11/8585417/google-map-maker-shut-down-android-urine I am kind of surprised that you would leave something like MAP information not being reviewed before being posted. I guess the trolls didn't knew that they can stuff like this until a month ago.

Google has posted their own guide to becoming a successful Software Engineer. The guide is a suggested path for University students to develop their skills but personally I don't see why someone younger couldn't do it if they have the dedication to accomplish the goal. Anyway, they do note that you should be aware of the following before/when using the guide: I think its great that Google has done this so people know what the industry wants. Though, of course, a lot of other companies want other things from you so just because Google suggests C++, Java or Python as an object oriented programming language to study, doesn't mean all companies use these. (Just a small tip, but hey those three are very big so what do I know ) THE GUIDE HERE: https://www.google.com/about/careers/students/guide-to-technical-development.html NOTE: I just noticed that some links lead to sites like Udacity which needs a subscription to use it. (Though, Udacity, I believe offers a free version of their service but without help from coaches and you do not receive certificates that you've completed things etc. But they do offer a 14 day free trial on the full version.) Just thought I'd point it out. Though, you can still use the guide from Google and the links that needs payment, find something else with the same content. Or pay if you really want that content of course!

Just got this plugin and I would like to know what settings you use or think are the best.

I haven't been able to get to ANY Google related things on the internet, except the search engine. I can launch Google Chrome, but it doesn't do anything. I cant search anything. I im reluctantly using Internet Explorer right now.. ;( I will check my firewall settings but I still need suggestions. I need help quick, im a growing YouTuber and I cant access YouTube to upload. plz help quick ;-;

Android M has a very hidden feature for Multiwindow support for Nexus Phones and tablets! Other android manufacturers have implemented this in previous skinned versions of android such as Samsung's TouchWiz on their Galaxy Note series. This is the first time that the feature is implemented into a Nexus build and is a very exciting look at the future of Android multitasking. Though the feature is not enabled by default it is able to be with some tinkering. Thoughts?

So what google does is to detect flash content and tell you it is there before running the content, and give you control over how it should be displayed. " When you’re on a webpage that runs Flash, we’ll intelligently pause content (like Flash animations) that aren’t central to the webpage, while keeping central content (like a video) playing without interruption. If we accidentally pause something you were interested in, you can just click it to resume playback. This update significantly reduces power consumption, allowing you to surf the web longer before having to hunt for a power outlet. " makes me think that the safari browser already have the feature and now google is implanting it and makes my laptop run for a longer time source : http://9to5google.com/2015/06/04/google-chrome-aims-to-improve-laptop-battery-life-by-intelligently-pausing-flash-content/

Hello Iam using Gmail as the main email account, use it for paypal, Apple store, Domain and Hosting Account, Facebook account, Even here on linus forums But it was a huge mistake !! Google let people get my gmail account used with other way? Recintly i got emails says that i registered to account from Dropbox, but i have Dropbox already! and called me a name that it not my name! when i mailed to Dropbox support they said : The emails you received were for username@gmail.com and not user.name@gmail.com . While those addresses are the same to gmail they are different to Dropbox, so those accounts are separate and not related. that's really makes me afraid that a lot of emails of mine could be recived wrong?! when i do some research i found those links https://support.google.com/mail/answer/10313?hl=en https://productforums.google.com/forum/#!topic/gmail/V8JwA2uZ4Jo[1-25] http://gmail-miscellany.blogspot.com/2012/08/wrong-email-gmail-dots-issue.html i feel like i have shared email account or something?! this is scarry really although i checked the security activties and seems fine. is some one had this problem before?

Hi guys So I just downloaded the new Google Photos program to my computer, as well as the updated app to my phone. I thought I might as well just upload my whole picture collection since they are offering free storage as long as the pictures are less than 16 megapixels. I know of a few people that did the same thing, and have their entire collection searchable in Google Photos, seems to be really neat. By people I know, I mean internet known people, but not that I know personally, hence I can't ask them how they did it. I however of course ran into problems, it seems my client I installed on my computer does not understand the concept of sub-folders. I point the program to my Pictures folder, in which I have neatly sorted sub-folders by categories, year and sometimes which camera which was used taking the picture. Google Photo down in the system tray claims everything is synced, but I can't see most of my pictures when I look it up online(only the ones synced from my phone). I tried to move a picture out of a sub-folder into the main picture folder which the program is pointed to, and the Google Photo client immediately starts to sync the picture. Now I don't want to move all my thousands upon thousands of pictures into a big pile of mess in the root of the pictures folder, is there any way to circumvent this obvious flaw ?

This new service from Google lets you search all your uploaded images using terms like aeroplane! Quite truly amazing! But if you were slightly concerned about the integration of personal pictures that get sorted by likenesses, Google's Anil Sabharwal was quoted as saying "It is important for us to make this a private home for your photos" The big benefit of the new service is the free 15GB of storage within Google drive with a paid subscription after that "up to US$1.99 per month for 100GB and US$9.99 per month for 1TB" This is available to you if you are willing to store all of your pictures in the cloud. Of course it frees up space on your phone for those who have not enough device storage and cannot slip in a MicroSDHC. The upload of digital content will be to a resolution of 16 megapixels for pictures and 1080p videos. Those 4K videos on your device you would more than likely need to pay for at their rates PLUS the data transfer charges (from your carrier or account). HHHOOOOOWWWWWEEEVVVEEERRR Having more than one Google account (as I am sure many others do too) the need arises to upload "selected" pictures into one particular account, not a whole photo-album OR folder-container. This was particularly noticed when a picture was taken to be used in blogger, and that was the only reason or need for the picture(s), for it to be utilised in THAT account. The work around as there seemed to be no way to back up a selected series (my case it was only three) was to share the images required to DRIVE, which can be done within the installed phone generic photo application. This then creates the conundrum of whether this app is in all actuality a useful resource, OR just a Google "bling-bling" fail-over / marketing device to sell the next version "yawn" mobile device? It is understood that it is possible to once the pictures are backed up, from the backup service to share across "platforms". However what need then is there to waste bandwidth uploading the ENTIRE library into each account? When DRIVE seems to be more than capable of doing this task, quite admirably anyway, already? Source -click here- www.wired.com

source: https://firstlook.org/theintercept/2015/05/21/nsa-five-eyes-google-samsung-app-stores-spyware/ --- whoopty doo "no comment" mister effin' google <_<

TheVerge reports that YouTube is launching a 60fps live streaming option to its service. This also commes with HTML5 playback, so you will be able to go back and see what was streamed before. Source: http://www.theverge.com/2015/5/21/8634039/youtube-60fps-video-game-streaming I think that they need way more than just 60fps ... like proper support and promotion for streamers like Twitch. In other words, for popular streamers to monetize this.

Source:http://www.google.com,O= Google Inc,L = Mountain View,ST = California,C = US Valid From 6 May 2015, 10:29 a.m. Valid To 4 Aug 2015, midnight Serial Number 5F:BB:FC:7C:4C:6E:FF:92 (6898384865036533650) CA Cert No Key Size 2048 bits Fingerprint (SHA-1) 4B:9D:33:E6:4E:F6:10:4E:20:43:BF:1E:09:28:92:4F:6D:41:33:7A Fingerprint (MD5) 3E:35:9B:E7:DB:85:D1:5B:98:06:B5:2E:E2:36:0E:68 SANS http://www.google.com As this is a server-end ssl certificate - SHA1 fingerprint - 4B9D33E64EF6104E2043BF1E0928924F6D41337A - there is no authoritative database against which we can check it to simply verify it is "legitimate" or not. One of the many frustrations and failures of CA-based certificates is the utterly imprecise nature of what a "fraudulent" certificate is, or is not. Rather than being a binary yes/no question, we're left with vast swaths of arguable gray-zone... for even professional researchers, debate over the legitimacy of particular certs can go on for weeks... or longer. However, a few quick tests don't provide confidence-inspiring results: First, the cert is signed SHA1 and Google has long since moved away from this as a suitable cert-signing algorithm. Nor is it perhaps some ancient root certificate signed as such decades ago: this one claims to have been issued 6 May 2015 - less than 10 days ago. Is someone at Google really issuing SHA1-signed certs in May of 2015? This seems highly unlikely. Second, the cert-embedded "Authority Information - OCSP" URI (a nearly-vestifial form of not-CRL but also not-full-cert-pinning certificate recovation procedure that we will not bore you with explaining in further detail here) - http://clients1.google.com/ocsp404s when loaded.This is not the sort of thing one will find in a legitimately Google-issued certificate, created less than 10 days ago. (the fact that CRL, OSCP, and other cert-embedded URIs routinely lead to 404s, endless redirects, dead air, and mysterious 'numbers-radio' style short strings of digits - quite often in the case of full root certificates - is one of those realities of CA-certificate existence that is rarely commented on, but remains surreal in its implications)... Here's the URI that's supposed to represent the issuer's 'official' credentials, which in theory helps the benighted browser operator verify if the certificate matches this issuer's credentials (although the specifics of doing that match are both impressively complex, and even if done right do not yield valid/fraud clarity but only some degree of qualified 'maybe'): view-source:http://pki.google.com/GIAG2.crt. The certificate that gets provided at that URL is as follows (after a pre-conversion from .crt/DER to .PEM, of course): -----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE----- That, in turn unpacks to... Full unpack here: 0 1008: SEQUENCE { 4 728: SEQUENCE { 8 3: [0] { 10 1: INTEGER 2 : } 13 3: INTEGER 146038 18 13: SEQUENCE { 20 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 5) 31 0: NULL : } 33 66: SEQUENCE { 35 11: SET { 37 9: SEQUENCE { 39 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 44 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 48 22: SET { 50 20: SEQUENCE { 52 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) 57 13: PrintableString 'GeoTrust Inc.' : } : } 72 27: SET { 74 25: SEQUENCE { 76 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 81 18: PrintableString 'GeoTrust Global CA' : } : } : } 101 30: SEQUENCE { 103 13: UTCTime 05/04/2013 15:15:55 GMT 118 13: UTCTime 31/12/2016 23:59:59 GMT : } 133 73: SEQUENCE { 135 11: SET { 137 9: SEQUENCE { 139 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER countryName (2 5 4 6) 144 2: PrintableString 'US' : } : } 148 19: SET { 150 17: SEQUENCE { 152 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER organizationName (2 5 4 10) 157 10: PrintableString 'Google Inc' : } : } 169 37: SET { 171 35: SEQUENCE { 173 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER commonName (2 5 4 3) 178 28: PrintableString 'Google Internet Authority G2' : } : } : } 208 290: SEQUENCE { 212 13: SEQUENCE { 214 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER rsaEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 1) 225 0: NULL : } 227 271: BIT STRING : 30 82 01 0A 02 82 01 01 00 9C 2A 04 77 5C D8 50 : 91 3A 06 A3 82 E0 D8 50 48 BC 89 3F F1 19 70 1A : 88 46 7E E0 8F C5 F1 89 CE 21 EE 5A FE 61 0D B7 : 32 44 89 A0 74 0B 53 4F 55 A4 CE 82 62 95 EE EB : 59 5F C6 E1 05 80 12 C4 5E 94 3F BC 5B 48 38 F4 : 53 F7 24 E6 FB 91 E9 15 C4 CF F4 53 0D F4 4A FC : 9F 54 DE 7D BE A0 6B 6F 87 C0 D0 50 1F 28 30 03 : 40 DA 08 73 51 6C 7F FF 3A 3C A7 37 06 8E BD 4B : [ Another 142 bytes skipped ] : } 502 231: [3] { 505 228: SEQUENCE { 508 31: SEQUENCE { 510 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 35) 515 24: OCTET STRING : 30 16 80 14 C0 7A 98 68 8D 89 FB AB 05 64 0C 11 : 7D AA 7D 65 B8 CA CC 4E : } 541 29: SEQUENCE { 543 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER subjectKeyIdentifier (2 5 29 14) 548 22: OCTET STRING : 04 14 4A DD 06 16 1B BC F6 68 B5 76 F5 81 B6 BB : 62 1A BA 5A 81 2F : } 572 18: SEQUENCE { 574 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER basicConstraints (2 5 29 19) 579 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 582 8: OCTET STRING 30 06 01 01 FF 02 01 00 : } 592 14: SEQUENCE { 594 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER keyUsage (2 5 29 15) 599 1: BOOLEAN TRUE 602 4: OCTET STRING 03 02 01 06 : } 608 53: SEQUENCE { 610 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER cRLDistributionPoints (2 5 29 31) 615 46: OCTET STRING : 30 2C 30 2A A0 28 A0 26 86 24 68 74 74 70 3A 2F : 2F 67 2E 73 79 6D 63 62 2E 63 6F 6D 2F 63 72 6C : 73 2F 67 74 67 6C 6F 62 61 6C 2E 63 72 6C : } 663 46: SEQUENCE { 665 8: OBJECT IDENTIFIER authorityInfoAccess (1 3 6 1 5 5 7 1 1) 675 34: OCTET STRING : 30 20 30 1E 06 08 2B 06 01 05 05 07 30 01 86 12 : 68 74 74 70 3A 2F 2F 67 2E 73 79 6D 63 64 2E 63 : 6F 6D : } 711 23: SEQUENCE { 713 3: OBJECT IDENTIFIER certificatePolicies (2 5 29 32) 718 16: OCTET STRING 30 0E 30 0C 06 0A 2B 06 01 04 01 D6 79 02 05 01 : } : } : } : } 736 13: SEQUENCE { 738 9: OBJECT IDENTIFIER sha1WithRSAEncryption (1 2 840 113549 1 1 5) 749 0: NULL : } 751 257: BIT STRING : 27 8C CF E9 C7 3B BE C0 6F E8 96 84 FB 9C 5C 5D : 90 E4 77 DB 8B 32 60 9B 65 D8 85 26 B5 BA 9F 1E : DE 64 4E 1F C6 C8 20 5B 09 9F AB A9 E0 09 34 45 : A2 65 25 37 3D 7F 5A 6F 20 CC F9 FA F1 1D 8F 10 : 0C 02 3A C4 C9 01 76 96 BE 9B F9 15 D8 39 D1 C5 : 03 47 76 B8 8A 8C 31 D6 60 D5 E4 8F DB FA 3C C6 : D5 98 28 F8 1C 8F 17 91 34 CB CB 52 7A D1 FB 3A : 20 E4 E1 86 B1 D8 18 0F BE D6 87 64 8D C5 0A 25 : [ Another 128 bytes skipped ] : } It's SHA1 fingerprint is: BBDCE13E9D537A5229915CB123C7AAB0A855E798. This intermediate certificate appears to match up with the intermediate certificate provided by the questionable www.gooogle.com page-load, so we do a search on the SHA1 value of the cert's hash to see if it appears in conventional, common search results. Here it is, showing up at the invaluable ssl-tools.net site... although we also noted ourselves, in twitter recently, that this intermediate certificate pops up in some other google server-end of questionable veracity (here's the #fishycerts shapshot if it, for those curious): Our conclusion on this server-end certificate being offered as credentials putatively backing this 'secure' https session to www.google.com ( 4B9D33E64EF6104E2043BF1E0928924F6D41337A) is that it's illegitimate. The intermediate cert to which it chains (BBDCE13E9D537A5229915CB123C7AAB0A855E798) does appear legitimate... but also seems to be signing more than its fair share of questionable server-end 'Google' SSL certificates. What does that mean, and how does that correlation flesh out into possible theories for causative connection? We simply don't know, yet. Further research is required. Our search on this server-end certificate's SHA1 hash value - 4B9D33E64EF6104E2043BF1E0928924F6D41337A - turns up no hits, anywhere online (nor for the lowercase-converted version, 4b9d33e64ef6104e2043bf1e0928924f6d41337a). Even if there are obscure mentions somewhere we could not find, the comparison between that and widely-distribued legitimate Google server-end certificates is, in a word, enormous. - - - This post, drafted and edited by the cryptostorm team during a 36 hour window stretching from Friday afternoon through Sunday morning GMT, in fact covers a time-window longer than the transient phenomenon it has documented. By the time final edits were being finished, a check at ssl-labs for IP and certificate results received when their testing suite looks at www.google.com now yeilds the following results. Gone entirely are the two 212.*.*.* IP addresses, and in their place are a string of 74.*.*.*'s that have a much longer history of correlation with Google services (if still some weird results in terms of ssl cert credibility): In the place of cert 4B9D33E64EF6104E2043BF1E0928924F6D41337A, a server-end certificate SHA1 1219337d219d1684f785bbabe688cea429ac6ee1 is now being presented when ssl-labs asks for the site... that cert is signed as well by intermediate certificate BBDCE13E9D537A5229915CB123C7AAB0A855E798, making it something of a half-sibling to the questionable 4b9d one we saw earlier in this investigation (only a few hours ago). {edited to add: the 4b9 and 1219 certificates appear to be overlapping each other in some ssl-labs test runs, and in browser session tests by some cryptostorm staff members - but not others - as this report has completed editing and is being published... which, as we have seen previous, is not in and in itself indicative of malfeasance but is another component of the suspiciously erratic & coincidence-laden pattern we have been observing} - - - We expect this kind of elliptical, somewhat tedious form of "forensics" to emerge as the norm in Corruptor-Injector Network attack analysis. Such attacks are transient, their 'session prion' payload is buried in otherwise-innocuous http/https traffic hitting the browser via routine, innocuous web browsing (that such attacks will be highly successful beyond the relatively well-defended confines of the browser DOM sandbox is both inevitable, and frightening - protocols like jabber, sftp, and all the weird Java-wrapped cryptographic 'secure' network procedures each carry its own risk of injected prion and collapse of the entire local endpoint security model). A few points to reiterate: 1. This is a session to http://www.google.com, not an obscure website. It's 'secured' by https, backed by the fearsome expertise and professional focus of google's entire Chrome security team, and then some. It relates to a session during which visitors download an installer for chrome; if that installer is modified even marginally, and achieves uptake on the local machine, all security is gone. 2. Certificates involved in effectively spoofing https credentials from google appear to be signed by genuine Google intermediate SHA1-signed certificates. The mechanism for this is not clear yet, but there are dozens of PoC'd methods for a well-resourced attacked to complete this step. 3. It's not clear that blaming "the browsers" for this makes sense. It is not the job of browsers to enfore routing legitimacy, although whose job that actually is remains an open question. The browsers can run about cancelling server-end certificates left and right, but it does nothing to address the problem of the injection/hijack gambit itself. 4. A cursory review of DNS records suggests the vast space for temporary resource hijacking via cache poisoning and/or BGP borking forms a core element of these attacks as they exist in the wild today. While there are brilliant researchers out there able to diagnose such transient DNS anomalies, the fact is such anomalies are so common, and so fundamental to DNS as it has evolved, that we gain little in rehasing that well-explored ground. 5. We haven't even looked at IP6 in this analysis, despite some early evidence that it forms a crucial element of observed CIN methods. The same can be said for SPDY, QUIC, and other next-generation protocols: each designed and coded by brilliant women & men, but none having anything in the way of long track record in the wilds of CIN-infested routing landscapes. 6. This is one instance of this we've chosen to document here, in short form, as a test case and proof of (research) concept. We have files and forensics on dozens more, from obscure websites to serious resources used by hundreds of millions of internet citizens every day. Once we began keeping track o such things several months ago, the examples built up faster and faster... a "backlog of weirdness," as one staffer apologetically explained to a cryptostorm member who had seen data suggesting CIN activity, and hoped we'd be able to review it closely to confirm. 7. We see the consequences of this routinely in our member correspondence, globally, on a daily basis. Local computers that have strange network-connectivity problems. Difficulty installing routine packages like openssl or openvpn. Broken cryptographic deployments that cannot support our tightly-enforced standards for cryptostorm session authenticity... these weird goings-on have grown more and more common for us to see, month after month. They foreshadow a deluge of such functionality thefts by CINs from internet users worldwide. "Total pwnage" - as the NSA glibly calls it. Sounds far-fetched? Here's what they have to say about their in-house CIN - #Balrog, we've named it - several years back: How would such a system work, in practical terms? Well, here's how: Moving to more tangible considerations, how would we know that SECONDDATE attacks were underway? Simple: we'd see network sessions inexplicably redirected to unexpected sites, and modified payloads arrive for those targeted individuals 'painted' by the CIN's selector logic. An attacker would gain enormous advantage if capable of injecting Chrome package downloads, even transiently. This may seem paranoid, to imagine the sheer arrogance required to play such dangerous games with one of the most powerful companies in the tech industy (and giving Google the benefit of initial assumption they are neither actively aware of these attacks, nor even passively helpless to stop them yet unwiling to make them public via full disclosure). And besides... packages are signed! ...right? Indeed. While it's beyond the scope of this report to go into the numerous proven methods for undermining such signing security, here's a partial list of links - for just one distro of Linux - showing what tends to happen when package-signing throws errors... https://code.google.com/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=249188 http://askubuntu.com/questions/1877/what-is-the-easiest-way-to-resolve-apt-get-badsig-gpg-errors http://askubuntu.com/questions/410519/cannot-install-anything-via-apt-get-problem-with-apt-get-update?rq=1 http://askubuntu.com/questions/552253/cannot-update-google-chrome-stable-with-apt-even-using-dist-upgrade?rq=1 http://askubuntu.com/questions/307563/why-am-i-getting-package-cannot-be-authenticated-errors-for-google-chrome http://askubuntu.com/questions/470699/ubuntu-12-04-gpg-error-http-archive-ubuntu-com-precise-release-the-following http://askubuntu.com/questions/258435/sudo-apt-get-install-google-chrome-stable-current-amd64-deb-is-not-working?rq=1 http://askubuntu.com/questions/555800/upgrading-chrome-stable-aptitude-reports-version-39-but-chrome-chrome-reports?rq=1 http://askubuntu.com/questions/362327/unable-to-install-google-chrome-in-ubuntu12-04-via-google-chrome-stable-current?rq=1 There's more, hundreds and hundreds of posts of Linux users - a tiny percentage in the larger OS ocean - having these problems, leading back years. Of course, some - perhaps the majority or even nearly all, are simply the horrifically complex reality of package signing validation if done manually. For those curious, here's Google's Linux Chrome repo howto page with signing key and terse, if excellent, advice for users. That said, it's hosted on http://www.google.com itself... so is the key as-intended by Google? Is it always that way? If even 5% of those desperate posts reporting failures of the Chrome packages to pass gpg signature-verification are malicious... that's many tens of thousands of Linux Chrome users whose local machines have been irrevocably rooted by an unknown, invisible attacker. We captured the Chrome package as delivered from the suspect www.google.com page, this weekend. It's too early to say if it shows evidence of direct modification from legitimate parameters; several test-versions downloaded from other sources over the weekend appear to show the same size metrics, on the surface. However, SHA1 hashing is inconclusive: we have divergent hash values for our local copies, as compared to hashes posted elsewhere on the web by others recently for the same version and processor images... but that is far from conclusive, and more work is required. Let's look at the package itself, meanwhile. For example, here's the --postinst script in the package captured by us this weekend: #!/bin/sh## Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved.# Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be# found in the LICENSE file.set -e# Add icons to the system iconsXDG_ICON_RESOURCE="`which xdg-icon-resource 2> /dev/null || true`"if [ ! -x "$XDG_ICON_RESOURCE" ]; then echo "Error: Could not find xdg-icon-resource" >&2 exit 1fifor icon in "/opt/google/chrome/product_logo_"*.png; do size="${icon##*/product_logo_}" "$XDG_ICON_RESOURCE" install --size "${size%.png}" "$icon" "google-chrome"doneUPDATE_MENUS="`which update-menus 2> /dev/null || true`"if [ -x "$UPDATE_MENUS" ]; then update-menusfi# Update cache of .desktop file MIME types. Non-fatal since it's just a cache.update-desktop-database > /dev/null 2>&1 || true# Updates defaults.list file if present.update_defaults_list() { # $1: name of the .desktop file local DEFAULTS_FILE="/usr/share/applications/defaults.list" if [ ! -f "${DEFAULTS_FILE}" ]; then return fi # Split key-value pair out of MimeType= line from the .desktop file, # then split semicolon-separated list of mime types (they should not contain # spaces). mime_types="$(grep MimeType= /usr/share/applications/${1} | cut -d '=' -f 2- | tr ';' ' ')" for mime_type in ${mime_types}; do if egrep -q "^${mime_type}=" "${DEFAULTS_FILE}"; then if ! egrep -q "^${mime_type}=.*${1}" "${DEFAULTS_FILE}"; then default_apps="$(grep ${mime_type}= "${DEFAULTS_FILE}" | cut -d '=' -f 2-)" egrep -v "^${mime_type}=" "${DEFAULTS_FILE}" > "${DEFAULTS_FILE}.new" echo "${mime_type}=${default_apps};${1}" >> "${DEFAULTS_FILE}.new" mv "${DEFAULTS_FILE}.new" "${DEFAULTS_FILE}" fi else # If there's no mention of the mime type in the file, add it. echo "${mime_type}=${1};" >> "${DEFAULTS_FILE}" fi done}update_defaults_list "google-chrome.desktop"# This function uses sed to insert the contents of one file into another file,# after the first line matching a given regular expression. If there is no# matching line, then the file is unchanged.insert_after_first_match() { # $1: file to update # $2: regular expression # $3: file to insert sed -i -e "1,/$2/ { /$2/ r $3 }" "$1"}# If /usr/share/gnome-control-center/gnome-default-applications.xml exists, it# may need to be updated to add ourselves to the default applications list. If# we find the file and it does not seem to contain our patch already (the patch# is safe to leave even after uninstall), update it.GNOME_DFL_APPS=/usr/share/gnome-control-center/gnome-default-applications.xmlif [ -f "$GNOME_DFL_APPS" ]; then# Conditionally insert the contents of the file "default-app-block" after the# first "<web-browsers>" line we find in gnome-default-applications.xml fgrep -q "Google Chrome" "$GNOME_DFL_APPS" || insert_after_first_match \ "$GNOME_DFL_APPS" \ "^[ ]*<web-browsers>[ ]*$" \ "/opt/google/chrome/default-app-block"fi# Add to the alternatives system## On Ubuntu 12.04, we have the following priorities# (which can be obtain be installing browsers and running# update-alternatives --query x-www-browser):## /usr/bin/epiphany-browser 85# /usr/bin/firefox 40# /usr/bin/konqueror 30## While we would expect these values to be keyed off the most popular# browser (Firefox), in practice, we treat Epiphany as the lower bound,# resulting in the following scheme:CHANNEL=stablecase $CHANNEL in stable ) # Good enough to be the default. PRIORITY=200 ;; beta ) # Almost good enough to be the default. (Firefox stable should arguably be # higher than this, but since that's below the "Epiphany threshold", we're # not setting our priority below it. Anyone want to poke Firefox to raise # their priority?) PRIORITY=150 ;; unstable ) # Unstable, give it the "lowest" priority. PRIORITY=120 ;; * ) PRIORITY=0 ;;esacupdate-alternatives --install /usr/bin/x-www-browser x-www-browser \ /usr/bin/google-chrome-stable $PRIORITYupdate-alternatives --install /usr/bin/gnome-www-browser gnome-www-browser \ /usr/bin/google-chrome-stable $PRIORITYupdate-alternatives --install /usr/bin/google-chrome google-chrome \ /usr/bin/google-chrome-stable $PRIORITY# System-wide package configuration.DEFAULTS_FILE="/etc/default/google-chrome"# sources.list setting for google-chrome updates.REPOCONFIG="deb http://dl.google.com/linux/chrome/deb/ stable main"APT_GET="`which apt-get 2> /dev/null`"APT_CONFIG="`which apt-config 2> /dev/null`"SOURCES_PREAMBLE="### THIS FILE IS AUTOMATICALLY CONFIGURED #### You may comment out this entry, but any other modifications may be lost.\n"# Parse apt configuration and return requested variable value.apt_config_val() { APTVAR="$1" if [ -x "$APT_CONFIG" ]; then "$APT_CONFIG" dump | sed -e "/^$APTVAR /"'!d' -e "s/^$APTVAR \"\(.*\)\".*/\1/" fi}# Install the repository signing key (see also:# https://www.google.com/linuxrepositories/)install_key() { APT_KEY="`which apt-key 2> /dev/null`" if [ -x "$APT_KEY" ]; then "$APT_KEY" add - >/dev/null 2>&1 <<KEYDATA-----BEGIN PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----Version: GnuPG v1.4.2.2 (GNU/Linux)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Quqp-----END PGP PUBLIC KEY BLOCK-----KEYDATA fi}# Set variables for the locations of the apt sources lists.find_apt_sources() { APTDIR=$(apt_config_val Dir) APTETC=$(apt_config_val 'Dir::Etc') APT_SOURCES="$APTDIR$APTETC$(apt_config_val 'Dir::Etc::sourcelist')" APT_SOURCESDIR="$APTDIR$APTETC$(apt_config_val 'Dir::Etc::sourceparts')"}# Update the Google repository if it's not set correctly.# Note: this doesn't necessarily enable the repository, it just makes sure the# correct settings are available in the sources list.# Returns:# 0 - no update necessary# 2 - errorupdate_bad_sources() { if [ ! "$REPOCONFIG" ]; then return 0 fi find_apt_sources SOURCELIST="$APT_SOURCESDIR/google-chrome.list" # Don't do anything if the file isn't there, since that probably means the # user disabled it. if [ ! -r "$SOURCELIST" ]; then return 0 fi # Basic check for active configurations (non-blank, non-comment lines). ACTIVECONFIGS=$(grep -v "^[[:space:]]*\(#.*\)\?$" "$SOURCELIST" 2>/dev/null) # Check if the correct repository configuration is in there. REPOMATCH=$(grep "^[[:space:]#]*\b$REPOCONFIG\b" "$SOURCELIST" \ 2>/dev/null) # Check if the correct repository is disabled. MATCH_DISABLED=$(echo "$REPOMATCH" | grep "^[[:space:]]*#" 2>/dev/null) # Now figure out if we need to fix things. BADCONFIG=1 if [ "$REPOMATCH" ]; then # If it's there and active, that's ideal, so nothing to do. if [ ! "$MATCH_DISABLED" ]; then BADCONFIG=0 else # If it's not active, but neither is anything else, that's fine too. if [ ! "$ACTIVECONFIGS" ]; then BADCONFIG=0 fi fi fi if [ $BADCONFIG -eq 0 ]; then return 0 fi # At this point, either the correct configuration is completely missing, or # the wrong configuration is active. In that case, just abandon the mess and # recreate the file with the correct configuration. If there were no active # configurations before, create the new configuration disabled. DISABLE="" if [ ! "$ACTIVECONFIGS" ]; then DISABLE="#" fi printf "$SOURCES_PREAMBLE" > "$SOURCELIST" printf "$DISABLE$REPOCONFIG\n" >> "$SOURCELIST" if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then return 0 fi return 2}# Add the Google repository to the apt sources.# Returns:# 0 - sources list was created# 2 - errorcreate_sources_lists() { if [ ! "$REPOCONFIG" ]; then return 0 fi find_apt_sources SOURCELIST="$APT_SOURCESDIR/google-chrome.list" if [ -d "$APT_SOURCESDIR" ]; then printf "$SOURCES_PREAMBLE" > "$SOURCELIST" printf "$REPOCONFIG\n" >> "$SOURCELIST" if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then return 0 fi fi return 2}# Remove our custom sources list file.# Returns:# 0 - successfully removed, or not configured# !0 - failed to removeclean_sources_lists() { if [ ! "$REPOCONFIG" ]; then return 0 fi find_apt_sources rm -f "$APT_SOURCESDIR/google-chrome.list" \ "$APT_SOURCESDIR/google-chrome-stable.list"}# Detect if the repo config was disabled by distro upgrade and enable if# necessary.handle_distro_upgrade() { if [ ! "$REPOCONFIG" ]; then return 0 fi find_apt_sources SOURCELIST="$APT_SOURCESDIR/google-chrome.list" if [ -r "$SOURCELIST" ]; then REPOLINE=$(grep -E "^[[:space:]]*#[[:space:]]*$REPOCONFIG[[:space:]]*# disabled on upgrade to .*" "$SOURCELIST") if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then sed -i -e "s,^[[:space:]]*#[[:space:]]*\($REPOCONFIG\)[[:space:]]*# disabled on upgrade to .*,\1," \ "$SOURCELIST" LOGGER=$(which logger 2> /dev/null) if [ "$LOGGER" ]; then "$LOGGER" -t "$0" "Reverted repository modification: $REPOLINE." fi fi fi}DEFAULT_ARCH="i386"get_lib_dir() { if [ "$DEFAULT_ARCH" = "i386" ]; then LIBDIR=lib/i386-linux-gnu elif [ "$DEFAULT_ARCH" = "amd64" ]; then LIBDIR=lib/x86_64-linux-gnu else echo Unknown CPU Architecture: "$DEFAULT_ARCH" exit 1 fi}NSS_FILES="libnspr4.so.0d libplds4.so.0d libplc4.so.0d libssl3.so.1d \ libnss3.so.1d libsmime3.so.1d libnssutil3.so.1d"add_nss_symlinks() { get_lib_dir for f in $NSS_FILES do target=$(echo $f | sed 's/\.[01]d$//') if [ -f "/$LIBDIR/$target" ]; then ln -snf "/$LIBDIR/$target" "/opt/google/chrome/$f" elif [ -f "/usr/$LIBDIR/$target" ]; then ln -snf "/usr/$LIBDIR/$target" "/opt/google/chrome/$f" else echo $f not found in "/$LIBDIR/$target" or "/usr/$LIBDIR/$target". exit 1 fi done}remove_nss_symlinks() { for f in $NSS_FILES do rm -rf "/opt/google/chrome/$f" done}remove_udev_symlinks() { rm -rf "/opt/google/chrome/libudev.so.0"}remove_udev_symlinks## MAIN ##if [ ! -e "$DEFAULTS_FILE" ]; then echo 'repo_add_once="true"' > "$DEFAULTS_FILE" echo 'repo_reenable_on_distupgrade="true"' >> "$DEFAULTS_FILE"fi# Run the cron job immediately to perform repository configuration.nohup sh /etc/cron.daily/google-chrome > /dev/null 2>&1 & Phew. Three-hundred and seventy-six lines. A Chromium Debian reference build - not identical, to be clear, in package parameters - nevertheless is notable for its comparative size: #!/bin/sh # # Copyright (c) 2009 The Chromium Authors. All rights reserved. # Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be # found in the LICENSE file. @@[member=include02]@@../common/postinst.include # Add to the alternatives system # # On Ubuntu 12.04, we have the following priorities # (which can be obtain be installing browsers and running # update-alternatives --query x-www-browser): # # /usr/bin/epiphany-browser 85 # /usr/bin/firefox 40 # /usr/bin/konqueror 30 # # While we would expect these values to be keyed off the most popular # browser (Firefox), in practice, we treat Epiphany as the lower bound, # resulting in the following scheme: CHANNEL=@@[member=Channel11]@@ case $CHANNEL in stable ) # Good enough to be the default. PRIORITY=200 ;; beta ) # Almost good enough to be the default. (Firefox stable should arguably be # higher than this, but since that's below the "Epiphany threshold", we're # not setting our priority below it. Anyone want to poke Firefox to raise # their priority?) PRIORITY=150 ;; unstable ) # Unstable, give it the "lowest" priority. PRIORITY=120 ;; * ) PRIORITY=0 ;; esac update-alternatives --install /usr/bin/x-www-browser x-www-browser \ /usr/bin/@@[member=usrevenge]_BIN_SYMLINK_NAME@@ $PRIORITY update-alternatives --install /usr/bin/gnome-www-browser gnome-www-browser \ /usr/bin/@@[member=usrevenge]_BIN_SYMLINK_NAME@@ $PRIORITY update-alternatives --install /usr/bin/google-chrome google-chrome \ /usr/bin/@@[member=usrevenge]_BIN_SYMLINK_NAME@@ $PRIORITY @@[member=include02]@@../common/apt.include @@[member=include02]@@../common/symlinks.include remove_udev_symlinks add_udev_symlinks ## MAIN ## if [ ! -e "$DEFAULTS_FILE" ]; then echo 'repo_add_once="true"' > "$DEFAULTS_FILE" echo 'repo_reenable_on_distupgrade="true"' >> "$DEFAULTS_FILE" fi # Run the cron job immediately to perform repository configuration. nohup sh /etc/cron.daily/@@PACKAGE@@ > /dev/null 2>&1 & Sixty-seven lines. A report of very unusual behaviour on the part of that script, from 2012. A Lintian scan of the .deb package reads as follows... E: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/PepperFlash/libpepflashplayer.so: opensslE: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/chrome: lcms2E: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/chrome: srtpE: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/chrome: sqliteE: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/chrome: libpngE: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/chrome: libxml2E: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/chrome: libjpegE: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/chrome: libjsoncppE: google-chrome-stable: embedded-library opt/google/chrome/libffmpegsumo.so: libavutilE: google-chrome-stable: statically-linked-binary opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrapE: google-chrome-stable: statically-linked-binary opt/google/chrome/nacl_irt_x86_32.nexeE: google-chrome-stable: debian-changelog-file-missing-or-wrong-nameW: google-chrome-stable: new-package-should-close-itp-bugW: google-chrome-stable: debian-changelog-line-too-long line 3E: google-chrome-stable: no-copyright-fileW: google-chrome-stable: description-synopsis-starts-with-articleW: google-chrome-stable: extended-description-line-too-longE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/E: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/E: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/PepperFlash/E: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/PepperFlash/libpepflashplayer.soE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/PepperFlash/manifest.jsonE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/chromeE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandboxW: google-chrome-stable: setuid-binary opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox 4755 root/rootE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/chrome_100_percent.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/cron/E: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/cron/google-chromeE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default-app-blockE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default_apps/E: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default_apps/docs.crxE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default_apps/drive.crxE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default_apps/external_extensions.jsonE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default_apps/gmail.crxE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default_apps/search.crxE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/default_apps/youtube.crxE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/google-chromeE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/icudtl.datE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/libffmpegsumo.soE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/libwidevinecdm.soE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/libwidevinecdmadapter.soE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/E: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/am.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ar.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/bg.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/bn.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ca.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/cs.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/da.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/de.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/el.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/en-GB.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/en-US.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/es-419.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/es.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/et.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/fa.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/fi.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/fil.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/fr.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/gu.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/he.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/hi.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/hr.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/hu.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/id.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/it.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ja.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/kn.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ko.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/lt.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/lv.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ml.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/mr.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ms.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/nb.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/nl.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/pl.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/pt-BR.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/pt-PT.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ro.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ru.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/sk.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/sl.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/sr.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/sv.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/sw.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/ta.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/te.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/th.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/tr.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/uk.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/vi.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/zh-CN.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/locales/zh-TW.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/nacl_helperE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrapE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/nacl_irt_x86_32.nexeE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/natives_blob.binE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_128.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_16.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_22.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_24.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_256.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_32.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_32.xpmE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_48.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/product_logo_64.pngE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/resources.pakE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/snapshot_blob.binE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/xdg-mimeE: google-chrome-stable: dir-or-file-in-opt opt/google/chrome/xdg-settingsW: google-chrome-stable: non-standard-dir-perm usr/share/doc/google-chrome-stable/ 0700 != 0755E: google-chrome-stable: executable-manpage usr/share/man/man1/google-chrome.1E: google-chrome-stable: manpage-not-compressed usr/share/man/man1/google-chrome.1W: google-chrome-stable: manpage-has-errors-from-man usr/share/man/man1/google-chrome.1 1: warning: macro `"' not definedW: google-chrome-stable: binary-without-manpage usr/bin/google-chrome-stableW: google-chrome-stable: pkg-not-in-package-test google-chrome usr/share/menu/google-chrome.menuE: google-chrome-stable: prerm-calls-updatemenusW: google-chrome-stable: executable-not-elf-or-script usr/share/man/man1/google-chrome.1E: google-chrome-stable: shlib-with-non-pic-code opt/google/chrome/libffmpegsumo.soLintian finished with exit status 1 Do these results match known-good equivalents? It's entirely possible they do... but we'll be double-checking that, to be sure. However, it's much harder to come up with a legitimate explanation for the presence of this parameter: <netscape-remote>true</netscape-remote> In /apt/google/chrome/default-app-block... <web-browser> <name>Google Chrome</name> <executable>/opt/google/chrome/google-chrome</executable> <command>/opt/google/chrome/google-chrome %s</command> <icon-name>google-chrome</icon-name> <run-in-terminal>false</run-in-terminal> <netscape-remote>true</netscape-remote> <tab-command>/opt/google/chrome/google-chrome %s</tab-command> <win-command>/opt/google/chrome/google-chrome --new-window %s</win-command> </web-browser> Netscape-remote" shows up in only a few places, including the Russian-presenting "Sisyphus" nonstandard repository, in a Gnome-related package called "gnome-control-center" - we're helpfuly informed that "If you install GNOME, you need to install control-center." It's not clear if this repository is borked or not. What is clear is that the parameter for remote-access is flagged "true" in the build we got from "www.google.com" this weekend. It seems highly unlikely that's the default setting coming out from Google liegitimately... although, as with all such things, we welcome correction from specific subject-matter experts. These transient issues with strange 'google' certificates have been repeating themselves during the past couple months. In early April, a journalist in the UK reported on invalid Gmail SMTP certs being served to users worldwide for several hours. The issue was reported on twitter... but the tweet is now gone. It appears everyone assumed this was an error on Google's part (comments left on the article cited - two of them indicate transient continuance of the issue up through mid-April at least, although blame is cast on Google for 'misconfiguring' gmai's servers), although the carefully-worded status updated Google provided are notable in not actually saying anything specific whatsoever... And of course, in early May we flagged the unusual sibling-cert publicly in twitter. But what about the GPG signatures, right? That's the bulwark, and we've not addressed it. Our results are preliminary and await confirmation, because... well, because gnupg. We're going to provide a sample of output from our signature-validation efforts, locally; it is representative of what we've seen in the short period we've been working this particular angle. Once again, it could be we've managed to mis-specify the test - code-signing is not our cryptographic focus, despite cryptostorm being... well, something of a crypto-specalist shop in daily work life. These results remain open to clarification and correction, as we prepare to publish this report. - - - Corruptor-Injector attacks are not the sole province of the NSA, or their #Balrog system. China has made use of similar capabilties, often quite publicly - with a notable emphasis on session hijack of https 'secure' communiations via fraudulent certificates at mass scale. Private versions of the technology exist as well. An old cryptographic adage goes that mathematical cryptanalytic attacks always get better; they never get worse. Corruptor-Injector Network systems apppear to have reached an inflection point; in game-theoretic terms, a potential 'tragedy of the commons' amoungst those giant entities who have them already. Once word begins to spread of how CINs work, the incentive to keep them under wraps drops asymptotically - since each attacker knows other attackers are likely to jump forward in aggressiveness and public visibility, even if they refrain. Thus, each has an incentive to be 'first to break' and the accelerating aggressiveness of these CIN tactics accelerates even further. The end result is, in a word, internet chaos. The security - and privacy - consequences of these tools spiralling into a frenzied battle for injector-primacy on our shared internet are simply impossible to overstate. Anyone infected with these - 'painted' by them, as disinfection is not structurally possible - will see themslves essentially driven offline if they are aware of the attack and must mitigate the security damage proactively by air-gapping. Those unaware they have been injected with a live session prion are rooted, and every activity of their computer, or smartphone, is being logged and remotely archived: email, encryption keys, chat logs, 'secure' web sesions, application updates. Screenshots are being taken and uploaded to the attacker, microphones enabled to record sound nearby, and webcams enabled to snap photos of the operator. None of the items in this devil's list of extreme privacy violations is a could-be-possible, or a hypothetical. Leaked documents validate each one is being done, and more so each has been automated and works without manual intervention. There is no greater threat to online privacy, network security, and the continued effective functioning of the internet for the next half-decade or more than Corruptor-Injector Networks, and their accelerating spread. All other threats combined likely don't meet the level CINs represent. CINs are the 'dirty bombs' of mass surveillance: brutal, destructive, producing a long-term legacy of crippled internet functionality that will cost tens of billions of dollars in real human benefits foregone to these macabre engines of corruption. But far worse than the economic devastation is the human cost of these privacy annhiliations, one person at a time. Activists picked up in their homes, tortued to death, bodies dumped in empty field by dictators with access to CIN intelligence. Minority groups wiped clean in tactical genocides enabled by absolutely totalistic, perfect intelligence data produced by CINs for violent fascists. Democratic political systems undermined by the massive blackmail leverage of total CIN visibility in the hands of opponents... the list goes on. The time to face CINs as the threat they have become is now. The data exist to validate already-existing deductive confirmation of their expanding footprint, thanks to Snowden and other whistleblowers. At cryptostorm, we are all-in to enable broad-scope CIN-evasion techniques, systems, architectures, and services. Already we're working on layered approaches, fluid and flexible and decentralised. The tools exist to do this - good tools, well-tested - but the will to face the threat will be the key driver. We have that will, because we know the damage our members face if they are without protection from CIN. It is our obligation to provide that protection, as a security service, and we look forward to working with other researchers to expand our vision and, in time, retake the internet from the power-mad corruption of these obscene mechanisms. With sincerity, ~ cryptostorm_team

There are files that I want to delete but I can't. Each of those files have subfiles. This is bothering me so much. Whenever I try to delete them in command prompt as an admin, it tells me that those files don't exist or false directory. Very frustrating. The Files: D:\cock >Speech & Debate >>Sophcores >>>Seasoned Curlies >>>>Guns Don't Kill People, Peacekeepers Do >>>>>Evidence >>>>>>Con (D:\cock\Speech & Debate\Sophcores\Seasoned Curlies\Guns Don't Kill People, Peacekeepers Do\Evidence\Con) >>>>Smash Burglers >>>>>Evidence >>>>>>Con (D:\cock\Speech & Debate\Sophcores\Seasoned Curlies\Smash Burglers\Evidence\Con)

So, I'm writing a short paper this week about google. I wrote one last week....about google. I need to come up with a strategic goal for google, I can't think of anything other than acquiring more small startups with unique and promising idea's. I did a google search, but I was hoping to come up with something more concrete.

Google is now allowing users to download a copy of their entire search history. First, you’ll need a Google account. From there, pop over to your Account History page, click the cog in the top right of the screen and select Download. Once you agree to Google’s brief albeit important notification, you can click Create Archive at which time the search giant will compile your search history into a JSON file sorted chronologically by quarter. Once complete, you’ll receive an e-mail with a link to your search history in Google Drive that can be downloaded as a ZIP file. Source: http://www.zdnet.com/article/now-you-can-download-your-entire-search-history-from-google/

Originally the internet thought that Samsung was intentionally crippling 'Ok, Google' functionality but word on the street is that its actually something Google changed that is causing issues. Not that I'm shocked, Google has some issues on the software front these days and then attempting to dump their problems onto OEMs and then convincing their customers that it isn't their problem at all. I hope this gets fixed. I like S Voice, but Ok, Google is nice too. Hopefully they fix up the problems for users (reports of Samsung, Nexus and OPO devices) who want to make use of both. Here was a S6 at launch: S6 after the update: http://www.phonearena.com/news/Did-you-know-Ok-Google-voice-command-comes-crippled-on-Samsungs-Galaxy-S6-S-Voice-promoted-instead_id68477

Source: http://www.theverge.com/2015/4/22/8467433/google-launches-mobile-service Damn boy! This is going to be GREAT for people in the U.S. The ONLY drawback is that the only possible phone available is the Nexus 6. Granted, it's not a bad phone, but this might push some people away due to the huge size of the phone and its general flaws. In any case, this is dirt cheap, and is pretty darn interesting, especially considering you can access the T-Mobile and Sprint network. Pricewise, it's amazingly competitive. I would absolutely love to switch over to theis network, and potentially bring my entire family over to this, making a huge switch over. However, it seems to be quite cost prohibitive considering the high cost of the phone initially. I would love to see a CHEAP Nexus device at around $300 like the Nexus 5 that would work with this network. Then, Google would have a winner on its hands, with a cheap phone and wireless plan to absolutely force carriers to innovate. This is going to change things, though I'm curious why Google wanted to go this direction. Considering its reluctance and lack of desire to become an ISP, I don't really know why it wants to become a cell carrier. Oh well, I'm not complaining. GO GOOGLE!

Me pretty Mantis Shrimp. << Click here to learn more about why Mantis Shrimp is so pretty and awesome! By: TheOatmeal https://www.google.com/?gws_rd=ssl#q=earth+day+quiz&oi=ddle&ct=ddle-hpp&hl=en

Apple Pay is not only the most used mobile payment service it seems that it's also the most loved and easy to use. The only problem now is that it need's to come to other countries such as the UK, Canada and Australia. The wait is all too long, and surprisingly Australia seems the most prepared being that about 99%* of stores that have an EFTPOS terminal are NFC capable. *99% isn't an actually figure I'm just using a hyperbole to give you some sort of perspective. OP: http://bgr.com/2015/04/21/apple-pay-paypal-google-wallet/

The school I go to (and will soon be leaving) has always had stringent policies on web browsing that has caused somewhere around 75% of all websites to be blocked. It got worse ever since we were given iPads, and to my horror, even LTT was blocked at the beginning of the school year, despite the fact that I was able to access it the spring beforehand. But, today, a helpful classmate showed me an interesting way of bypassing it. All I have to do is go to translate.google.com, enter the URL of the website I want to go to, and BAM. I can access it. Unfortunately, there are three limitations that I am aware of so far. The first is that most, but not all, images fail to load. I dunno why that is. File types, maybe? Secondly, if I use a search function on a website that is normally blocked, such as Amazon or eBay, the resultant search is blocked. I can still browse, though. Third, I can't log in to LTT or change the theme. So, I can still read everything while I'm at school, but I can't talk. (Not that I do it much anyway.) And for those of you wondering, the filter still affects our iPads when we're at home. ):

Confirmed late yesterday, head of privacy for GoogleX and Google adventurer Dan Fredinburg was kill as a result of head trauma during the Nepal Earthquake. http://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/news/sophia-bushs-ex-dan-fredinburg-dies-from-nepal-earthquake-avalanche-2015254 Very sad, sounds like he was a nice guy.

My google chrome is downloading files at 150KB/s while steam downloads at 4.0MB/s I have 30 down and 10 up.

Hello everyone, First off I am brand new to the forum but I have been watching Linus' videos for awhile now and he helped decide on parts for my build but that is not what I am here for. I am having issues with setting up a sign in button for Google accounts on my site. I am aware of the process (client, credentials, handshake with google, token, etc.) however I am lost at beginning to implement it. I would like to use the log in to let users use a web application. That application is written in javascript and called from html but switching over to php should not be an issue. I have been researching this for a few days now and have only come up with documentation on what is happening behind the scenes with the exchanges of information. I see guides for setting up an OpenID Connect server but I don't think that is what I need to do, unless it is and I'm just dumb. If you could help out that would be awesome.

As it stands, Google could be providing the greatest batch of cloud services around. Keyword "could". I've been a power user of Drive and it's related services since Google Docs first hit the mainstream. I always loved the constant updates the services saw, and the ease of uploading a variety of different formats. Recently, however, there has been a lot of crap going on. Google Play Music for example. 50,000 songs I can upload for free? Awesome. Too bad the click and drag way of uploading almost always produces duplicates in the library, and often misses files. Too bad i can't add at last a viewable version of my music library to my Drive, which I would like to use as similarly to Windows Explorer as possible. Google Photos recently got an overhaul. Okay, cool. Interesting- the web design doesn't resemble any of the other google services. Similar to how Drive looks a bit different than gmail, and a lot different than Google music. Alright, free uploads under 16 megapixels? Awesome, the perfect way to store all of the photos I take with my phone! Too bad the upload system is incredibly wonky and filled with bugs, and the functionality that allows google photos to be viewed in Drive only works about half the time and seemingly forgets that I have arranged them into albums. What's more, I was perfectly content uploading photos straight into Drive and viewing/downloading them for editing as necessary. Too bad the free <16MP storage only applies to "Google Photos." Sometimes, even Docs that I've deleted won't stop showing up in Drive for months. What is going on, Google? Get it together. Get one team on it. Keep the web design consistent and fluid as well as functional. Make a Google Drive that has Docs, Photos, Videos, and Music within one big view and allows the user to fully invest in the cloud. Not some weird, buggy bullshit. /endrant